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Welfare Effects  of Agricultural
Trading Blocs:  The Simulation of a
North American Customs Union
P. Lynn Kennedy and Karol W. Hughes
Agricultural  trade  liberalization  among  the  three  North  American  Free  Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) signatories is modeled using a political preference function. The
model distinguishes  among  Canada, Mexico,  the United  States,  and a politically
passive rest of the world. Through the use ofintracountry compensation, the analysis
shows that, from  an agricultural  perspective,  economic  integration is in the best
interest  of the  group as a whole,  although not in  the best interest of individual
countries. More specifically,  of the agricultural production sectors, Canadian dairy,
Mexican corn, and U.S. beef producers suffer the greatest losses from the formation
of a North American customs union.
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Introduction
The period leading up to the passage of the North American  Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)  was filled with controversy  as to NAFTA's impact  on the three  signatory
countries.  Opinions  on  this  subject  ranged  from  Ross  Perot's  criticism  that  the
agreement  would result in a "giant sucking sound" as U.S. jobs move south, to views
that NAFTA would serve as a catalyst for economic prosperity in North America (Racz).
Regardless  of the outcome  of this debate,  the impact on domestic prices of removing
trade  barriers  among  Canada,  Mexico,  and  the  United  States  will  have  welfare
consequences throughout the economies of the three countries.
Given  the  levels  of  agricultural  protection  prior to  NAFTA,  it is  clear that the
agreement will influence agricultural trade in North America (Barichello et al.; Grennes
et al.).  In particular,  projections  indicated that North  American trade liberalization
would expand U.S. agricultural exports, with grains, oilseeds, and meats accounting for
the majority of the increase (Claffey and Harwood;AgExporter  staff). The initial results
of NAFTA's implementation show that agricultural trade rose significantly during the
first year, while the second  year was affected  by the peso devaluation  and resulting
economic slump (Goodloe).
Various  approaches  have  been taken in examining  the  effects  of NAFTA on  the
agricultural sector. For example, researchers have analyzed NAFTA's impact on specific
commodities  such  as  sugar  (Devadoss,  Kropf,  and  Wahl),  fruits  and  vegetables
(Goddard), and red meat (Veeman). These analyses provide specific commodity-related
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information,  but do not account for many agricultural cross-effects resulting from the
agreement.  In contrast, broader examinations of NAFTA have been conducted using a
computable  general equilibrium model (Robinson, Burfisher, and Thierfelder). Models
of this type often use a level of aggregation that does not indicate specific agricultural
commodity effects. To obtain information relevant to policy makers, analyses must be
conducted that account for cross-effects  and offer some  specificity as to the gains and
losses to producers, consumers, and the government as a result of the agreement.
With NAFTA,  gains  and losses will occur in various segments  of the agricultural
sectors in all three countries. The primary objective of this research is to quantify the
welfare  effects  of a North  American  agricultural  free trade  agreement  through the
simulation of a North American customs union. To accomplish this objective, a political
preference  function  (PPF)  composed  of  specific  agricultural  production  sectors,  a
consumption  sector,  and  a government  budget  sector  is used to  simulate  economic
integration among the NAFTA countries.
Theoretical Framework
This analysis uses a multicommodity model of agriculture. N commodities are produced,
consumed, and traded by K main countries andt  the res  o  the world. Vectors of supply,
demand, and excess demand represent the levels of aggregate production, consumption,
and trade for each country. The supply sector in country k produces a combination of the
N commodities in order to maximize profits given prices, technology, and endowments.
Aggregate  production  of the N  commodities  is represented  by the  vector  of supply
functions,  Sk(PSk; XSk),  where  PSk is the vector of prices  observed by the supply sector,
and  XSk  is  a  vector  of exogenous  variabls  such  as  technology,  input  prices,  and
endowments  for the supply sector of country k. Aggregate consumption  of the N com-
modities is represented by the vector of demand functions Q^(PQk; XQk), where PQk is the
vector of prices observed by the final demand sector, and XQk  is a vector of exogenous
variables for country k.  The aggregate level of trade in the N  commodities for country
k is represented by the vector of excess demand functions Mk (Mkl, M 2,...,  MkN), where
Mki(PSk,  PQk; XSk,  XQ)  represents excess demand in country k for commodity i; Mki  > 0
indicates net imports, and Mk^  < 0 indicates net exports of commodity i for i = 1,  2,  ...,
N.
Governments  influence  domestic markets  through the use  of price  (71)  or  supply/
demand  shift (a) instruments.  Price instruments, denoted as  ASki  for producers  and
AQi for consumers in country k of commodity i, affect the prices observed by the supply
and final demand sectors. With the world price of commodity i represented  as Pw,  the
domestic price functions for country k are
(1)  PZki  = PZki(Aki, Pwi)  for i  = 1, 2, ...,N,  and for Z = S, Q.
Supply/demand shift instruments, shown as A'  sand A'Q  ,respectively, for producers
and consumers of commodity i in country k, are implicit elements of vectors XSk and XQk
that  shift  supply  and  demand  functions  by  modifying  nonprice  elements  of the
producers' or consumers' decision process. In order to make these instruments explicit,
the vectors XSk  and XQk are defined as follows:
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o  0
(2)  Xsk  =  XSk(Ask;  Xs),  and  Xk = XQk(Ak;  XQk),
where Xs  and XQk  signify vectors ofnonpolicy exogenous variables, As  represents the
vector (As 1,A Sk2 ,...  ,AS),  and AQk  represents the vector (AQ^1 , AQk2, . . .,AkN).
Through the substitution of the domestic  price functions  (1) and the functions of
explicit variables (2), the aggregate supply, demand, and excess demand are expressed
as functions of world price, policy instruments, and exogenous variables in the following
terms:
(3)  Sk [Psk (Ask  Pw) ASk; Xsk ],
(4)  Qk[PQk(AQk,  P),  AQk; XQk],
and
(5)  Mko  o  0
(5)  Mk[PSk(ASk,  Pw),  PQk(AQk,  PW), ASk  AQ,;  XS,  XQ],
where Ask r  nts the vctor  (  A,  . represents the vector (A  A  represents the vector (A  ,
AQ,  ..,AQkN),  and  Pzk(Az,  Pw) = [Pzl(Ak, P),  P 2(A,  P),  ... , PzN(Ak, Pw)]forZ
=S,Q.
Let the main countries be denoted as countries  1, 2, ... , K, and the rest of the world
as country k  + 1.  The vector  of excess  demand functions  for the rest of the world is
shown as Mk+l(Pw; Xk+l),  where Xk+1 is the vector of exogenous variables for the rest of
the world. Through the adjustment of world prices, world markets are assumed to clear,
i.e., world markets are competitive. Therefore,
(6)  Mk[PSk(Ask,  PW),  PQk(AQk,  Pw)  AS^,  AQk; XSk^  XQ^]
k
+ Mk+l(PW;  Xk+l)=  0,
where  the right-hand  side  of the  equation  is  an N x  1 vector  of zeros.  Letting  the
vector of country k's actions (ASk,  AQk,  A  , Ak^)  be represented by Ak,  world prices are
expressed as functions of actions in equation (7):
(7)  Pw  = P  Xw[  ,  X),  (A2;  X2  ), ..., (AK;  oX,  X) PW  W  1'S1'  Q1  2w(A  S2;  Q2  o*'(K;'  XQK)P  (k+l]
Within the  agricultural  policy formulation  process, the welfare  effects  of various
actions are taken into account by governments.  Policy makers behave as though they
are using a weighting system to compare the gains and losses  of various groups. The
product of a weight and a money metric welfare measure (e.g., consumer and producer
surplus) is assumed to reveal the relative influence of a group's ability to transfer policy
support to itself. This concept is referred to as a political preference  function. The PPF
used in this analysis is a weighted, additive function of money metric welfare measures
for various  societal  groups.  It is the  objective  function  which,  through their  policy
choices, policy makers behave as though they seek to maximize.
This measure is used by Gardner in analyzing income redistribution in agriculture.
In addition, agricultural economists  have estimated political  preference  functions  in
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order  to  examine  policy  effects  among  various  agricultural  groups  (Rausser  and
Freebairn).  It  is assumed that competition  among groups for political  influence and
the desire  of the political process to appease these groups give rise to an equilibrium
where the gradients of the PPF with regard to policy instruments are zero. Based on this
assumption, the weights are estimated empirically at the point where the gradients are
zero for the observed level of policy instruments (Kennedy, von Witzke, and Roe).
Let  k+  denote  the  other  main  countries.  Producers  are  grouped  according  to
commodities, with their welfare defined as the profit obtained through the production
and  marketing  of that commodity.  Producer  quasi-rents,  consumer  utility,  and  the
government budget are shown as functions of government policies using the expressions
II(Ak, A,+), Uk(Ak,  Ak+),  and Bk(Ak,  Ak+),  respectively,  where Ak represents the actions of
country k, and Ak+ represents the actions of the other politically active countries.  The
budget weight is normalized to one, and the PPF-a function of government policies-is
expressed as
(8)  Vk(A,, Ak+)  =  k(Ak, A+) · k  + Uk(Ak,  Ak+)  *  .k  + Bk(Ak,,  Ak),
where XSk is a strictly positive N x 1 vector that represents the relative political weights
of the producer groups in country k, while XQk is a strictly positive vector representing
the relative political weights of the consumer groups in country k.
Differentiating  (8) with respect to producer-oriented  actions and consumer-oriented
actions, represented byASk andAQk, respectively, the first-order necessary conditions for
a maximum are as follows:
avk  a  i lk  aUlk  aBk
aAsk  aAs  aASk  aASk  Ask
(9)
dVk  alnk  aUk  Qk  j  dbk
AQk  aAQk  AQ  aAQkQk
Solving this equation for  XSk and XQk yields the PPF weights for the base period.
Let (A*, A*+)  represent actions prior to an agreement, and  (A*, AT  ) represent actions
agreed to by countries k and k+. In the situation where the main countries negotiate or
cooperate with one another, no agreement will be reached or kept unless the value of the
objective  function occurring from the agreement for each country k, Vk(A*, A*+), is at
least as great as that prior to the agreement, Vk(A,,  A*+).  A necessary condition for a
treaty is that there exists at least one pair of actions (A*,  A*+) satisfying
(10)  Vk(A,  A:)  V(A,  A+),  V k  =  12, ... K.
Empirical Analysis
To  model the effects  of trade liberalization,  the Modele Internationale  Simplifie  de
Simulation (MISS) is used. MISS is a simplified world trade model that simulates the
effects of various policy actions (Mahe, Tavera,  and Trochet). For the purposes of this
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examination, the world is divided into four regions: Canada (CAN), Mexico (MX), the
United States (US), and the rest of the world. Eight commodity groups are included in
the analysis: beef, corn, dairy, pork, rice, soybeans, sugar, and wheat.
The MISS model uses several identities to simulate the effects of policy changes on
the sectors of production, derived demand, and final demand for the regions examined.
The model operates  on the principle of Walrasian  equilibrium. Policy changes under-
taken by a country cause adjustments in the world price levels, resulting in changes in
supply and demand,  and a rebalancing of world trade.
Initial world market equilibrium for commodity i occurs where total supply and initial
stocks are equal to total derived and final demand. This equilibrium is shown as
(11)  ESik + Eik  = E  Dik  + EQik  Vi = 1,..., N,
k  k  k  k
where Sik,  ,ik  Dik, and Qik  represent supply,  initial stocks, derived demand, and final
demand, respectively,  for commodity i in country k.
Percentage changes in the supply and derived demand of commodity i are composed
of supply price and derived demand price effects with respect to all commodities. These
changes are represented by equations (12)  and (13):
(12)  8 (*  S  E**  D+ (ik  = (EijkPjk  + likPjk ),
and
(13)  dik  E  (FkPk + FP  ),  i,j = 1, .. .,N, and  k = 1, ... ,K,
J
where sik and dik represent percentage changes in supply and derived demand for com-
modity i in country k; E  k  and Ei *  represent supply elasticities for commodity i with
respect to output and input prices of commodityj, while Fi  and Fjk  represent derived
demand  elasticities  for  commodity  i  with  respect  to  output  and  input  prices  of
commodityj.  Changes in domestic supply and derived demand prices for commodityj
in country k are denoted by pj  and pj  , respectively.
The percentage  change  in the  final  demand  of commodity  k  is composed  of final
demand price effects with respect to price changes for all commodities. These changes
are represented by the equation
(14)  qik  = GkP,  V i,j =  1,...,N,  and  k =1,...,K,
where qik represents changes in demand for commodity i in country k, Gjk represents the
demand elasticities for commodity i with respect to consumer prices of commodityj, and
changes in consumer prices for commodityj in country k are denoted by pJ.
Final world market equilibrium for commodity k occurs where the change in supply
for each commodity is equivalent to the corresponding sum of changes in derived and
final demand. Using the previous equations, this is specified as
(15)  ESiksk  di=  D  +  ikq,  V i = 1, ...,N.
k  k  k
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Table 1.  Political Preference Function Weights
United States  Canada  Mexico
Rank  Weight  Rank  Weight  Rank  Weight
Beef  8  0.99  4  1.03  10  0.97
Corn  5  1.07  9  0.95  2  1.27
Dairy  4  1.11  1  1.31  9  0.97
Pork  10  0.85  7  0.99  5  1.08
Rice  3  1.15  10  0.00  3  1.26
Soybeans  6  1.04  5  1.02  4  1.17
Sugar  2  1.18  3  1.07  6  1.03
Wheat  1  1.20  2  1.21  1  1.28
Consumer  9  0.98  8  0.96  7  1.02
Budget  7  1.00  6  1.00  8  1.00
The domestic/world price linkage is such that the domestic price depends on the world
price, the exchange rate, domestic protection, and transportation  costs. This is repre-
sented by the equation
(16)  ,  P  ^ (16)  PPik  =Pi  CkTikWk,
or, in logarithmic terms where Wk is fixed,
z  W  z
(17)  Pik =P  + ck  + tik,  for Z = (S,D, Q),
where Pk represents  domestic price for commodity i in country k,  Pi  represents the
world price for commodity i, Ck denotes the number of country k currency units per U.S.
dollar,  Tik is the protection coefficient for commodity i, and Wk denotes a margin coeffi-
cient representing transportation costs. Lowercase letters signify a percentage change
in the respective quantity variables.
The empirical analysis is conducted using 1990 as the base year. The PPF weights for
the United States,  Canada,  and Mexico  are  derived through the simulation of incre-
mental changes in the observed policies from their base levels. The resulting changes
in producer welfare, consumer welfare, and government budget expenditures are used
as approximations of the partial derivatives in (9). When (9) is solved for Xsk and XQk, the
PPF weights are obtained.  This is accomplished using the MISS model based on 1990
quantity data [U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  1996],  price  data, protection
coefficients, and margin coefficients (USDA 1994), and previously estimated elasticities
(Gardiner, Roningen, and Liu). These approximated weights, normalized such that the
budget weight is one, are presented in table  1.
The  agricultural  policy  strategies  analyzed  assume  a  customs  union  among the
NAFTA countries. To accomplish this, a common protection level is used that maintains
the  overall  protection  level versus the rest of the world.  For example,  the common
producer protection level for a commodity is determined by taking a weighted average
of the individual participant  country protection levels,  shown by the equation TCi =
(ok  TikSik)/(k Sik), where TCi is the common producer protection level for commodity i,
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Table 2. Welfare Changes Resulting from Economic Integration (mil. U.S. $)
U.S.  Canada  Mexico  NAFTA
Social Welfare Function:
Canada/Mexico  9.65  333.19  -288.72  54.12
Canada/U.S.  -439.90  442.75  -0.05  2.80
Mexico/U.S.  106.26  5.44  399.83  511.53
Canada/Mexico/U.S.  -223.18  453.79  282.03  512.64
Political Preference Function (w/intracountry compensation):
Canada/Mexico  11.75  242.31  -563.63  -309.57
Canada/U.S.  -74.24  385.80  0.89  312.45
Mexico/U.S.  117.42  4.69  60.08  182.19
Canada/Mexico/U.S.  20.68  398.17  -84.83  334.02
Note:  Numbers represent change from the status quo.
Tik is the producer protection level for commodity i in individual customs union partici-
pant country k, and Sik  is the aggregate  production of commodity i in country k. The
simulations utilize the actions status quo (SQk)  and customs union (CUk) for k  = US,
CAN, MX. Each country k has action choices of retaining the status quo (SQk) orjoining
an agricultural customs union (CUk). In combination, these options result in four non-
status quo scenarios: (a) economic integration between Canada and Mexico, (b) economic
integration between Canada and the United States, (c) economic integration between
Mexico and the United States, and (d) economic integration among the three NAFTA
countries.  Products  of this  analysis  for  each  of these  scenarios  include  changes  in
producer welfare, consumer welfare, and budget savings resulting from policy changes.
These changes  in welfare are  compared using a social welfare  function (a political
preference function with weights of one) and a political preference  function using the
estimated weights and allowing for budget compensation within countries. In the case
of budget compensation,  each government  is  allowed to provide  compensation  from
budget savings to those sectors of its economy made worse off due to the policy liber-
alization.  Budget compensation  given to a  sector cannot  exceed  the amount  of that
sector's welfare loss. Because the weight of budget savings in the political preference
function is one, a sector must have a PPF weight greater than one in order to receive
compensation.  Budget compensation  is given in descending  order of welfare weights.
Finally, total budget compensation cannot exceed total budget savings. Note that budget
compensation  has  no  impact  on  the  government  objective  when  PPF  weights  are
identical.
Welfare changes resulting from the four scenarios  are presented in table 2. The use
of the social welfare function to analyze the changes in welfare shows that the aggregate
welfare is maximized when the three countries form a North American customs union.
However,  the results show that Canada is the only participant that would choose this
option; the U.S. and Mexico would be better off to form a coalition that excludes Canada.
The  same  results  occur  when  the  welfare  is  analyzed  using  a  weighted  political
preference function and allowing for intracountry budget compensation.
In order to achieve  a treaty such that overall welfare is maximized and each country
is made at least as well off as prior to the agreement, Canada might be able to provide
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Table 3.  Percentage  Changes in  Domestic  Prices Resulting from a North
American Free Trade Agreement
Producer Prices  Consumer Prices
U.S.  Canada  Mexico  U.S.  Canada  Mexico
Beef  -1.40  -0.44  5.83  -1.20  - 1.24  5.03
Corn  4.50  4.55  -36.00  14.50  0.13  -23.50
Dairy  9.40  -55.50  57.76  1.80  -34.50  28.00
Pork  2.73  0.73  -20.36  3.43  3.43  -25.55
Rice  -1.00  70.29  33.10  1.19  1.19  -8.00
Soybeans  1.60  -5.04  -20.60  8.95  8.95  -0.04
Sugar  -9.70  37.98  27.40  11.50  69.46  -21.00
Wheat  0.80  -1.00  -0.40  4.39  -0.72  -19.15
compensatory  payments to the United States  and Mexico and  still be better off than
without an agreement. These countries could then pass the remuneration along to their
most influential sectors that suffer a loss due to the agreement.  In this case, the U.S.
could compensate its sugar sector, while Mexico could compensate its wheat and corn
producers.  In this manner, by providing compensation to the other two countries from
its  budget  savings,  Canada  might  be  able  to create  a solution  where  each  of the
countries is better off than with the status quo. The political feasibility of intercountry
transfers is questionable. However,  tradeoffs in the manufacturing or services sectors
in exchange for concessions in the agricultural sector could approach compensation of
this type.
Agricultural Impacts of a
North American Customs Union
The implementation of a North American customs union will have various consequences
for  agricultural  producers  and  consumers  in  each  of  the  three  countries.  Not
surprisingly, producers with high protection levels, relative to those in other countries
during the base period, will be worse  off as a result of the customs union protection
levels.  Those  with  relatively  low initial  protection  levels  will  benefit.  This  section
provides selected indicators that result from forming the customs union. These include
changes in producer and consumer prices, changes in production and consumption, and
changes in welfare.
Changes in domestic prices resulting from the customs union are presented in table
3. The union, when viewed from a price perspective, hurts United States beef, rice, and
sugar producers;  Canadian beef,  dairy,  soybean, and wheat producers;  and Mexican
corn, pork, soybean, and wheat producers. From a consumer perspective, United States
consumers pay more for all commodities except beef; Canadian consumers pay more for
everything except beef, dairy products, and wheat; and Mexican consumers pay less for
everything except beef and dairy products.
The changes in production and consumption, presented in table 4, are consistent with
those expected as a result of the price changes, with a few exceptions. An increase in the
U.S. wheat producer and consumer prices results in a decrease in wheat production and
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Table  4.  Percentage  Changes  in  Production and Consumption Resulting
from a North American Free Trade Agreement
Production  Consumption
U.S.  Canada  Mexico  U.S.  Canada  Mexico
Beef  -1.29  -3.87  8.65  1.02  1.21  - 16.54
Corn  1.95  1.19  -22.99  -2.53  -0.06  9.36
Dairy  4.04  -30.08  23.81  -0.30  7.91  -3.64
Pork  1.07  2.39  -0.65  -2.95  -2.96  37.59
Rice  -0.40  0.00  20.42  -0.30  -0.30  -0.51
Soybeans  1.52  -2.05  -9.38  -3.54  -3.37  0.02
Sugar  -5.04  10.14  5.90  -2.58  -11.89  15.19
Wheat  -0.44  -0.50  -2.73  0.53  0.15  5.08
Table  5.  Change  in  Welfare  for Various  Sectors  Resulting from  a North
American Free Trade Agreement  (mil. U.S. $)
U.S.  Canada  Mexico
Beef  -507.57  2.50  321.31
Corn  969.72  30.50  -970.80
Dairy  1,861.03  -1,610.68  2,512.18
Pork  252.31  30.63  -318.59
Rice  - 17.89  0.00  21.00
Soybeans  87.28  -7.45  -84.95
Sugar  -197.53  10.89  215.24
Wheat  78.43  -42.59  -2.77
Consumer  -1,154.69  510.33  452.25
Budget  -1,594.27  1,529.66  -1,862.84
Social Welfare Function  -223.18  453.79  282.03
PPF w/o Compensation  20.68  -76.02  -84.83
PPF w/Compensation  20.68  398.17  -84.83
an increase in wheat consumption, while an increase in the Mexican consumer price of
rice results in a decrease  in rice consumption.  These instances are likely due  to the
cross-price  elasticity effects, perhaps with respect to corn.
Changes in producer welfare, as presented in table 5, are also consistent with those
expected  based  on  the  change  in  prices.  The  only  exception  occurs  in the  case  of
Canadian beef. Overall,  the U.S. consumer is worse off due to the new trade environ-
ment, while Canadian and Mexican consumers gain. As a result of adjusting policies to
join this  customs  union, table  5  shows  that the  Canadian  government  experiences
budget savings, while the United States and Mexico suffer budget losses resulting from
their new  protection  levels.  This  would  facilitate  the potential  cooperative  solution
mentioned earlier, resulting from Canada providing compensation to Mexico and the
United States.
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Conclusion
A North American customs union will affect the welfare of various agricultural interest
groups in Canada, Mexico, and the United States as policies that distort trade among
the three countries are reduced and eliminated. This examination has quantified the
gains and losses to various agricultural  sectors as a result of forming a customs union
by the NAFTA participants. Although this analysis  does not mirror the actual agree-
ment, it indicates the effects of free trade among these nations.
The results are particularly useful when compared with the actual North American
Free Trade Agreement.  For the most part, sectors shown to be harmed as a result of
these policies have received special attention within NAFTA. In light of the significant
losses shown to occur in the Canadian dairy sector, it is interesting to note that dairy
trade  was  not  addressed  by  the Canada-United  States Trade  Agreement  (CUSTA)
(Normile and Goodloe), nor was a dairy agreement reached between Canada and Mexico
under NAFTA (USDA 1993).
The results of this analysis provide two major implications for policy makers. First,
although  some sectors  in each of the three countries  are made worse off,  this study
indicates that a North American customs union will result in an overall welfare gain.
Despite this overall gain-and the fact that Canada benefits significantly by cooperating
with Mexico,  the U.S., or both-Mexico  and the United States would be better off by
forming a customs union that excludes Canada.  Policy makers should identify options
that will maximize  gains from trade through complete free trade among the NAFTA
countries.  One  avenue for accomplishing  this is through intercountry  compensation,
perhaps  in the form of trade  concessions  in the manufacturing  or  service  sectors. If
intercountry compensation of some type is impossible or politically infeasible, the results
of this analysis show that it is not in the best interest of Mexico and the U.S. to join a
Canada-Mexico-U.S.  customs union based solely on agriculture.
A second implication  for policy makers involves the potential gains from a Mexico-
U.S.  coalition.  The  results  of this  study  show  that,  from  the  standpoint  of their
agricultural  sectors,  Mexico  and the U.S.  should focus their negotiating  energies  on
achieving agricultural free trade with one another.  The United States must also keep
in mind that increased Mexican economic growth resulting from trade liberalization will
likely bring about greater future gains from trade.
If government officials are to use the results of this study in developing agricultural
trade coalitions, they must be aware of the limitations of this research. First, the model
is static.  It  does not account for long-run increases in demand that will occur  as the
result of free trade. Neither do the scenarios simulated in this model account for long-
run adjustments in production that correspond with free trade. As various factors shift
supply and demand, they will influence the effects of trade liberalization.  In addition,
the model uses a partial equilibrium framework  and does not account for any effects
outside the agricultural sector.
[Received January  1997; final revision received December 1997.]
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